Blockchain related talks

• Polygraph, Accountable Byzantine Agreement, Workshop on Verification of Distributed Systems (VDS), Marrakesh, Marocco.
• The Red Belly Blockchain, MIT, Cambridge, USA - Facebook, Menlo Park, USA - Visa Research, Palo Alto, USA, 2017.
• BFT is back but is it the same?, BTT at DISC 2018, Vienna, Austria.
• The Danger of Private Blockchain, DCCL, Chicago, USA, INRIA, U. Rennes, France and UNSW, Australia.

The Red Belly Blockchain

The Red Belly Blockchain (RBBC) is an unforkable blockchain able to commit more than 600K transactions per second with a latency of few seconds. As opposed to mainstream public blockchains, it is not subject to double spending - when an individual successfully spends their money more than once - because its chain of blocks never forks. As opposed to consortium blockchains, it does not bottleneck when numerous clients issue transactions at the same time, thanks to its leaderless consensus algorithm.

Blockchain related publications

• ComChain: A Blockchain with Byzantine Fault Tolerant Reconfiguration
  Guillaume Vizier, Vincent Gramoli
  Concurrency and Computation, Practice and Experience
  Oct 2019
  John Wiley & Sons (DOI:10.1002/cpe.5494)
  available  abstract  bib
• On the Performance of Distributed Ledgers for Internet of Things
  Runchao Han, Gary Shapiro, Vincent Gramoli, Xiwei Xu
  Internet of Things
  Aug 2019
  Elsevier (DOI:10.1016/j.iot.2019.100087)
  available  abstract  bib
• Blockchain Standard: Can We Reach Consensus?
  Vincent Gramoli, Mark Staples
  IEEE Communications Standards Magazine
  Sep 2018
  2 (3) p.16-21 (DOI:10.1109/MCOMSTD.2018.1800022)
  available  abstract  bib
• From Blockchain Consensus Back to Byzantine Consensus
  Vincent Gramoli
  Future Generation of Computer Systems
  Sep 2017
  Elsevier (DOI:10.1016/j.future.2017.09.023)
  available  abstract  bib
• Anonymity Preserving Byzantine Vector Consensus
  Christian Cachin, Daniel Collins, Tyler Crain, Vincent Gramoli
  Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'20)
  Sep 2020
  Springer
  available  abstract  bib
• Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees
  Rob van Glabbeek, Vincent Gramoli, Pierre Tholoniat
  Proceedings of the 32nd ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA'20)
  Jul 2020
  ACM
  available  abstract  bib
• The Attack of the Clones against Proof-of-Authority
  Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, Guillaume Jourjon
  Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS'20)
  Feb 2020
  Internet Society
  available  abstract  bib
• Formal Verification of Blockchain Byzantine Fault Tolerance
  Pierre Tholoniat, Vincent Gramoli
  6th Workshop on Formal Reasoning in Distributed Algorithms (FRIDA'19)
  Oct 2019
  available  abstract  bib
• Platypus: Offchain Protocol Without Synchrony
  Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, Vincent Gramoli
  Proceedings of the 18th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA'19)
  Sep 2019
  IEEE
  available  bib

  Offchain protocols aim at bypassing the scalability and privacy limitations of classic blockchains by allowing a subset of participants to execute multiple transactions outside the blockchain. While existing solutions like payment networks and factories depend on a complex routing protocol, other solutions simply require participants to build a emph{childchain}, a secondary blockchain where their transactions are privately executed. Unfortunately, all childchain solutions assume either synchrony or a trusted execution environment. In this paper we present Platypus, an offchain protocol that requires neither synchony nor a trusted execution environment. Relieving the need for a trusted execution environment allows Platypus to ensure privacy without trusting a central authority, like Intel, that manufactures dedicated hardware chipset, like SGX. Relieving the need for synchrony means that no attacker can steal coins by leveraging clock drifts or message delays to lure timelocks. In order to prove our algorithm correct, we formalize the chilchain problem as a Byzantine variant of the classic Atomic Commit problem, where closing an offchain protocol is equivalent to committing the whole set of payments previously recorded on the childchain "atomically" on the main chain. Platypus is resilience optimal and we explain how to generalize it to crosschain payments.

• Polygraph: Accountable Byzantine Consensus
  Pierre Civit, Seth Gilbert, Vincent Gramoli
  Workshop on Verification of Distributed Systems (VDS'19)
  Jun 2019
  available  abstract  bib
• The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on the Transaction Latency during ICOs
  Michael Spain, Sean Foley, Vincent Gramoli
  International Conference on Blockchain, Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics'19)
  2019
  Schloss Dagstuhl 71 p.9:1-9:15
  available  abstract  bib
• The Attack of the Clones Against Proof-of-Authority
  Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, Guillaume Jourjon
  Community Ethereum Development Conference (EDCON'19)
  2019
  available  abstract  bib
• DBFT: Efficient Leaderless Byzantine Consensus and its Applications to Blockchains
  Tyler Crain, Vincent Gramoli, Mikel Larrea, Michel Raynal
  Proceedings of the 17th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA'18)
  2018
  IEEE
  available  abstract  bib
• Impact of Man-In-The-Middle Attacks on Ethereum
  Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, Guillaume Jourjon
  Proceedings of the 37th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS'18)
  Oct 2018
  IEEE
  available  abstract  bib
• ComChain: Bridging the Gap Between Public and Consortium Blockchains
  Guillaume Vizier, Vincent Gramoli
  Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain'18)
  Jul 2018
  IEEE
  available  bib
• Evaluating Blockchains for IoT
  Runchao Han, Vincent Gramoli, Xiwei Xu
  Proceedings of the 9th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS'18)
  Feb 2018
  IFIP
  available  bib
• On Availability for Blockchain-Based Systems
  Ingo Weber, Vincent Gramoli, Mark Staples, Alex Ponomarev, Ralph Holz, An Binh Tran, Paul Rimba
  Proceedings of the 36th International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS'17)
  Sep 2017
  IEEE p.64-73
  available  bib
• The Balance Attack or Why Forkable Blockchains Are Ill-Suited for Consortium
  Christopher Natoli, Vincent Gramoli
  Proceedings of the 47th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN'17)
  Jun 2017
  IEEE p.579-590
  available  bib
• The Blockchain Anomaly
  Christopher Natoli, Vincent Gramoli
  Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA'16)
  Oct 2016
  IEEE p.310-317
  available  bib
• The Blockchain as a Software Connector
  Xiwei Xu, Cesare Pautasso, Liming Zhu, Vincent Gramoli, Alexander Ponomarev, An Binh Tran, Shiping Chen
  Proceedings of the 13th Working IEEE/IFIP Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA'16)
  Apr 2016
  IEEE p.182-191
  available  bib
• On the Danger of Private Blockchains
  Vincent Gramoli
  Workshop on Distributed Cryptocurrencies and Consensus Ledgers (DCCL'16)
  2016
  available  bib
• Blockchain Consensus
  Tyler Crain, Vincent Gramoli, Mikel Larrea, Michel Raynal
  19ème rencontres francophones sur les aspects algorithmiques de télécommunications (AlgoTel'17)
  2017
  available  bib

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last update: August 24th, 2020